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DOING BUSINESS IN EGYPT AFTER THE JANUARY
REVOLUTION: CAPITAL MARKET AND
INVESTMENT LAWS
By Radwa S. Elsaman1 & Ahmed A. Alshorbagy2
ABSTRACT:
Despite the Egyptian economy’s remarkable growth during the
last decade, unequal treatment at law and unfair distribution of
wealth led to the Revolution on January 25, 2011.  The Revolution af-
fected investment in Egyptian markets. Reforming business laws—
specifically the Capital Market and Investment Laws— has become
essential to restore confidence in Egyptian markets.  These two
branches of business law have undergone many developments over the
years, which have improved them significantly. Legal compliance,
however, remains a major concern.  This Article surveys the economic
activity in Egypt from a legal perspective.  It evaluates Egyptian laws
affecting economic activity by analyzing the effectiveness and short-
comings of relevant laws, and proposing the necessary amendments to
those laws in light of the Revolution’s impact.
1. INTRODUCTION
Egypt has witnessed remarkable economic growth in the last
decade. Most Egyptians, however, did not feel the effect of this growth.
The corruption of public officials and businessmen, who were fre-
quently motivated by politics, led to the concentration of most invest-
ment tools3 in the hands of the elite.4  This elite monopoly led to an
1 Commercial Law Assistant Professor, Cairo University Law School, Cairo,
Egypt; Associate with Ibrachy-Dermarkar Law Firm, Cairo, Egypt; S.J.D. Candi-
date 2009, LL.M. 2008, The American University Washington College of Law,
Washington D.C.; L.L.M. 2005, The International Maritime Organization Interna-
tional Maritime Law Institute, Malta; Postgraduate Diploma in Civil Law 2003,
B.A. 2002, Cairo University Law School, Cairo, Egypt.
2 Commercial Law Assistant Professor, Alexandria University Law School, Alex-
andria, Egypt; Lecturer at the Arab Academy for Science, Technology, and Mari-
time Transport in Alexandria, Egypt. S.J.D. Candidate 2009, LL.M. 2008, the
University of Virginia School of Law, Charlottesville, Virginia; B.A. 2006, Alexan-
dria University Law School, Alexandria, Egypt.
3 See infra and note 172.
4 CREDIT AGRICOLE BANK, EMERGING MARKET FOCUS: THE POINT OF NO RETURN,
EGYPT’S UNCERTAIN POLITICAL FUTURE, THE ECONOMY AND THE ARMY (Feb. 2011),
www.alfransi.com.sa/en/general/download/file/1027.
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unfair distribution of wealth, which eventually caused the January
2011 Revolution. The January Revolution has given rise to much eco-
nomic and political chaos. It rattled the national stock exchange and
shocked investors’ confidence in the Egyptian market. Reforming eco-
nomic laws will help boost the Egyptian economy and shorten the tran-
sition period before the economy rises again.5  In the long term,
curbing corruption and institutional reformation are the best means to
boost the economy and to achieve social and economic prosperity. The
faster these reforms take place, the sooner the Egyptian economy can
restore its strength and regain both national and international inves-
tor confidence.
This article evaluates Egyptian laws affecting economic activ-
ity by analyzing the effectiveness and shortcomings of the relevant
laws and proposing necessary amendments in light of the Revolution’s
impact. Conducting business in Egypt involves numerous different
laws, and it is difficult to cover all the relevant laws in a single article.
This article focuses on two specific branches of business law in Egypt:
Investment Incentives No. 8 of 1997 (“ILI”)6 and the Capital Market
Law No. 95 of 1992 (“CML”).7
The CML regulates the Capital Market Authority (“CMA”),
which was replaced by the Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority
(“EFSA”) as the main market supervisor.  The CML’s executive regula-
tions enjoy a special importance as secondary statutes8 because the
government has increasingly used them to regulate otherwise unregu-
lated or under-regulated capital market areas.9 The amendments to
the CML over the past decade have greatly enhanced Egyptian capital
market regulation by overcoming many previous deficiencies like the
under-regulation of insider trading and market manipulation. Al-
though parts of the law continue to require reform, such as takeover
regulation, the main problem with the CML is investor compliance.
5 See id.
6 Law No. 8 of 1997 (Law of Investment Guarantees and Incentives), Al-Jarida Al-
Rasmiyya, 11 May 1997 (Egypt).
7 Law No. 95 of 1992 (Law of Capital Market), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 22 June
1992 (Egypt).
8 Secondary statutes is a generic term that refers to regulations issued by the
executive authority rather than the by legislature.  In this sense, primary statutes
promulgated by the Parliament supersede secondary statutes that may not add,
change or violate the primary statutes. See MOHAMED KAMAL ABDUL-AZIZ, AL-
TANFITH ALMADANY FI DO’OE ALFIQH WALQADA’A [Civil Execution in the Light of
Jurisprudence and Judiciary] 18-25 (1980).
9 Minister of Economics and Foreign Trade Decree No. 135 of 1993 (Executive
Regulations of the Capital Market Law), Al-Jarida’ al-Rasmiyya, 8 Apr. 1993, vol.
81 F. no. 8 (Egypt); see also Law No. 95 of 1992 (Law of Capital Market), Al-Jarida
Al-Rasmiyya, 22 June 1992 (Egypt).
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Hence the EFSA, as the main market supervisor, should be granted
independence from governmental supervision to allow for greater neu-
trality. Moreover, educating investors about the importance of corpo-
rate governance will increase legal compliance, and improved
compliance will cause a more transparent market that will attract
more investors.
The ILI organizes both local and foreign direct investment in
Egypt.10  It has had a strong influence on the Egyptian investment
environment during the previous decade because it provides incentives
and guarantees for both local and foreign investors.11 The ILI also es-
tablished the General Authority of Investment and Free Zones
(“GAFI”), an authority that deals with investment issues.12 Likewise,
the ILI also provides for an independent dispute settlement system for
disputes arising between investors subject to its provisions. This may
be of great use towards reforming investment laws and regulations.
Furthermore, considering enforcement mechanisms to guarantee that
small investors can make use of investment laws and regulations in
Egypt is also necessary.
This explanation of the CML and ILI provides the necessary
overview of Egypt’s legal system, the situation with regard to Islamic
law, and the economic reasons for the January Revolution.  Under-
standing this is the initial step to do business in Egypt.  Part Two ex-
plains Egyptian securities regulations and proposes some reforms.
Part Three provides an overview of the investment environment in
Egypt, its laws, and provides guidelines for its reform.
2. OVERVIEW
2.1. Laws and Regulations
The Egyptian legal system is a combination of Islamic law—
known as Shari’a,— and the Napoleonic Code.13 Egypt is the first
Arab Middle Eastern country that voluntarily adopted Western style
codes in the late nineteenth century.14 Accordingly, Egypt is a civil law
country with a legal system based on codified law.15
10 See also Law No. 8 of 1997 (Law of Investment Guarantees and Incentives), Al-
Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 11 May 1997 (Egypt).
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Mohamed S. E. Abdel Wahab, Update: An Overview of the Egyptian Legal Sys-
tem and Legal Research GLOBALEX (2008), § 2, available at http://www.nyulaw
global.org/Globalex/Egypt1.htm.
14 GHISLAINE ALLEAUME, EGYPT AND ITS LAWS 1 (Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron &
Baudouin Dupret eds., 2002).
15 Wahab, supra note 13, at § 9.
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European legal models—particularly the French Civil Code—
influenced the Egyptian Civil Code.16 The Egyptian Civil Code is the
law governing private relationships between individuals in areas like
property, contracts, personal guarantees, and evidence.17 The civil law
also fills gaps for other branches of private law, such as commercial
law.
Egypt’s Commercial Code organizes trade and commerce.18 It
has more than 700 provisions covering different issues like commercial
contracts, banking, bankruptcy, and commercial paper.
The Companies’ Law No. 159 of 198119 and the old Egyptian
Commercial Law of 1883 govern business associations. The Egyptian
Companies’ law recognizes different forms of business associations
such as partnerships, limited partnerships, partnerships limited by
shares, limited liability companies, and corporations.20 Most of the
rules governing these forms of business associations are based on Eu-
ropean precedents.21
2.2. Judicial system
Egypt has two types of courts: civil and administrative, each
having different levels. Civil courts have first degree courts, second
degree courts, and the Egyptian Court of Cassation.22  First degree
court decisions are appealed before second degree courts, and those
decisions are appealed before the Court of Cassation.23 In addition, the
Law No. 120 of 2008 established specialized Economic Courts to decide
economic disputes.24 The State Council (“Conseil d’Etat”) handles ad-
ministrative disputes, and is composed of different levels of adminis-
trative courts—the highest of which is the Egyptian Supreme
Administrative Court.25 The Supreme Constitutional Court decides
16 ALLEAUME, supra note 14, at xxv.
17 Law No. 131 of 1948 (Civil Code), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 29 July 1948, vol. 108
(Egypt).
18 Law No. 17 of 1999 (Commercial Code), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 17 May 1999,
vol. 19 (Egypt).
19 Law No. 159 of 1981 (Companies’ Law), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 1 Oct. 1981,
vol. 40 (Egypt).
20 Tarek F. Riad, The Legal Environment for Investment in Egypt in the New Mil-
lennium, 15 ARAB L.Q. 117, 122 (2000).
21 Id.
22 ALLEAUME, supra note 14, at xxviii-xxix.
23 Id.
24 Law No. 120 of 2008 (Economic Courts Law), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 22 May
2008, vol. 21 (Egypt).
25 ALLEAUME, supra note 14, at xxviii-xxix.
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the constitutionality of laws and disputes among the different courts
and judicial bodies.26
Foreign judgment enforcement within Egypt requires the satis-
faction of certain conditions.27 For example, Egyptian courts must
have competence to decide the dispute.28  Furthermore, the parties are
duly and legally notified, that the judgment to be enforced must be
final, and it must not contradict any previous Egyptian court
decision.29
In Egypt, alternative dispute resolution is commonly used to
settle disputes outside of the court system.  The “Cairo Regional
Center for International Commercial Arbitration” is Egypt’s special-
ized arbitration center that oversees both domestic and international
cases.30  Egypt is also a party to the New York Convention, which en-
forces the disbursement of foreign arbitral awards in Egypt.31
2.3 The Effect of Islamic Law on the Egyptian Legal System
Egypt is a Muslim country that requires its main laws and reg-
ulations remain consistent with Shari’a law.32 The Egyptian Constitu-
26 Id.
27 Wahab, supra note 13, at § 9; see also Jalila Sayed Ahmed, Enforcement of For-
eign Judgments in Some Arab Countries – Legal Provisions and Court Precedents:
Focus on Bahrain, 14 ARAB L. Q. 169 (1999).
28 Wahab, supra note 13, at § 9.
29 Id.
30 See generally THE CAIRO REGIONAL CTR. FOR INT’L COMMERCIAL ARB. (CRCICA),
http://www.crcica.org.eg/factsheet.html.
31 See N.Y. ARBITRATION CONVENTION, CONTRACTING STATES (Sept. 1, 2011), http://
www.newyorkconvention.org/new-york-convention-countries/contracting-states.
Some conditions, however, exist for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in
Egypt such as the requirement that no previous arbitral award issued by an Egyp-
tian arbitration tribunal is there, the condition that the foreign arbitral award
does not contradict with the Egyptian public policy, and the condition that notifi-
cations of the issuance of the arbitral award and the requesting its enforcement
takes place. See also Wahab, supra note 13, at § 9.
32 “Muslim States” is a general term that does not only include Arab Middle East-
ern states, but also other states outside the Arab region whose populations are
mostly Muslim and where the state is a member of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference (OIC). NISRINE ABIAD, SHARIA, MUSLIM STATES AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY OBLIGATIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 32 (2008).  The word
Islam, formally, Al-Islam, refers to the religion of Muslims whose rules and princi-
ples are driven from the holy book,  [The] Qur’an.  [The] Qur’an is the Islamic holy
book revealed to the Prophet Muhammad. See also Glossary of Islamic Legal
Terms, 1 J. ISLAMIC L. 89, 99 (1996).  The word Shari’a literally means “the path or
the way”, and, in a legal sense, Shari’a refers to Islamic law or the entire system of
jurisprudence associated with Islam. See Mona Rafeeq, Rethinking Islamic Law
Arbitration Tribunals: Are They Compatible With Traditional American Notions of
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tion’s second provision provides: “Islam is the Religion of the State.
Arabic is its official language, and the principal source of legislation is
Islamic Jurisprudence (Shari’a).”33  Also, the Egyptian Supreme Con-
stitutional Court has held:
The principles of the Islamic Shari’a are the major
source of legislation. This imposes a limitation curtailing
both the legislative and executive power, through which
they are obliged that whatever laws or decrees they en-
act, no provision contained in them may contradict the
provisions of Islamic law which are definite in terms of
their immutability and their meaning. . .whatever legis-
lative enactment contravenes them must be declared
null and void.34
Accordingly, Shari’a strongly influences Egyptian laws and regula-
tions.  It also affects Egyptians’ trade and investment behavior.
Justice, 28 WIS. INT’L L.J. 108, 116 (2010). Shari’a is not simply a body of law but
rather an ethical code organizing one’s everyday life. See Charles P. Trumbull,
Islamic Arbitration: A New Path for Interpreting Islamic Legal Contracts, 59
VAND. L. REV. 609, 626 (2006).  The sources of Islamic law are divided into two
main categories: primary sources, which include the Qur’an and Sunnah, and sec-
ondary sources which include, inter alia, Ijma’a and Qiyas.  Adnan A. Zulfiqar,
Religious Sanctification of Labor Law:  Islamic Legal Principles and Model Provi-
sions, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 421, 422 (2007).  The Qur’an is a book of spiritual
guidance with rules for everyday life.  It is divided into Surahs (Chapters) and
each Surah is divided into verses.  Surah literally means “a series of things.” Glos-
sary of Islamic Legal Terms; see also Faisal Kutty, The Shari’a Factor in Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration, 28 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 565, 583 (2006).
Qur’anic provisions are considered the highest in the hierarchy of legal norms in
the Islamic legal system. MASHOOD A. BADERIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
AND ISLAMIC LAW 33 (2003). Sunnah refers to the actions of Prophet Muhammad,
his oral pronouncements, or concurrence in action by others.  Kutty, supra, at 585.
Sunnah  literally means “method” and refers to the second source of Shari’a which
is the sayings of Prophet Muhammad. Glossary of Islamic Legal Terms, supra.
When Qur’an and Sunnah do not provide specific guidance on an issue, Muslims
are directed to use reasoning to deduce rules, which is called Ijma and represents
the convergence of opinion on a particular new rule.  Irshad Abdal Haqq, Islamic
Law an Overview of its Origin and Elements, 7 J. ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 27, 36
(2002); see also Kutty, supra, at 589.  Whereas Ijma represents a form of collective
reasoning, Qiyas is an individual form based on analogical deduction. Haqq, supra
at 56. Qiyas is based on “[T]he use of reason to conclude that an existing rule
applies to a new situation because it is similar to the situation regulated by that
rule or to abstain from applying the existing rule to the new situation that is
proven dissimilar.”  Haqq, supra, at 56.
33 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended,
May 22, 1980, May 25, 2005, March 26, 2007.
34 Case No. 5257/43/1997/Constitutional Court  (Egypt).
2011] CAPITAL MARKET AND INVESTMENT LAWS 49
2.4 Economic Reasons for the January 25 Revolution
Despite the remarkable economic progress Egypt witnessed
throughout the last decade, middle class and lower class Egyptians did
not receive much of the financial benefit.35 The unfair distribution of
wealth augmented by the corruption of public officials and business-
men steered economic growth in the direction of the powerful few.36
Of course, profound political problems lay at the Revolution’s founda-
tion, but the igniter was the dreadful economic stance and high com-
modity prices.37
Moreover, Egypt has witnessed significant legal reform in its
economic sectors. For example, the Egyptian government adopted the
Capital Market Law in 1992 to help bolster the capital market.38
Egypt has also enacted an investment law to encourage both local and
foreign investment.39 A huge external debt and the failure to provide
jobs to Egyptians characterized the Mubarak era.40 In fact, the Egyp-
tian per-capita income ranks 137th worldwide.41  The CIA’s World
Fact book reports that twenty percent of Egyptians live under the pov-
erty line42 and forty percent live with a maximum of $2 USD per
day.43  Financial corruption and poverty led to the January Revolution
along with other political and social factors beyond this Article’s scope.
35 CREDIT AGRICOLE BANK, supra note 4.
36 See id.
37 See id.
38 Law No. 95 of 1992 (Law of Capital Market), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 22 June
1992, vol. 25 (Egypt).
39 Law No. 8 of 1997 (Law of Investment Guarantees and Incentives), Al-Jarida
Al-Rasmiyya, 11 May 1997, vol. 19 (Egypt).
40 Lama Abu-Odeh, On Law and The Transition To Market: The Case of Egypt, 23
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 351, 361 (2009).
41 Zachary Karabell, The Economic Roots of Egypt’s Revolt, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 1,
2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487038332045761140933608
52546.html.
42 Id.; see also Jonathan Berr, Hosni Mubarak’s Economic Achievements, DAILY
FIN. (Oct. 2, 2011), http://www.dailyfinance.com/story/hosni-mubaraks-economic-
achievements/19838632/. The Egyptian economy’s main sources were two billion
USD coming from American subsidies, five billion USD coming from tourism, and
10 billion USD coming from Suez Canal which eliminated all other sources of in-
come such as industry and trade.
43 World Fact Book - Egypt, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, available at https://
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html (last visited
Nov. 18, 2011); see also Mohammad Fadel, Labor and the Future of the Egyptian
Revolution, THE MIDDLE E. CHANNEL (Feb. 28, 2011, 3:44 PM), http://mideast.for-
eignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/28/labor_and_the_future_of_the_egyptian_
revolution.
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3. SECURITIES REGULATIONS
Although the Egyptian stock market is one of the oldest in the
world,44 socialist policies and the public sector-based economy adopted
during the mid-1950s resulted in the decline of the stock exchange.45
It was not until the 1990s that the Egyptian government began its
economic reform and restructuring program to move toward a free-
market economy.  In 1994, privatization began through public offer-
ings of profitable public sector companies. This led to the reactivation
and merger of the Egyptian stock markets into the Cairo and Alexan-
dria Stock Exchange (“CASE”).46  The Capital Market Law No. 195 of
1992 also contributed to the revival of the Egyptian Stock Exchange.47
Today, the Egyptian securities market is a major contributor to
Egypt’s economic development.48
3.1. Statutory Framework: Capital Market Law (CML)
Whereas the Capital Market Law (“CML”) No. 95 of 1995 and
its executive regulations No. 135 of 199349 are the main statutes regu-
lating the Egyptian securities market, the Central Depository Law
(“CDL”) No. 93 of 200050 and its executive regulations No. 906 of
2001,51 play an important role in record keeping, clearing and settle-
ment to assure fast securities exchange, and enhanced market liquid-
44 The Alexandria Stock Exchange was established in 1888, and a few years later
in 1903 the Cairo Stock Exchange was also incepted.  Both exchanges were very
active until the 1940s. See Shahira Abdel Shahid, Does Ownership Structure Af-
fect Firm Value?  Evidence from the Egyptian Stock Market 8 (Jan. 2003) (unpub-
lished manuscript) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=378580.
45 For a thorough discussion of Egyptian economic systems before and after the
1952 revolution and the development of public sector, see MOHAMED KAMEL
MALASH, MWSO’ET ALSHARIKAT [Encyclopedia of Companies], 693-98 (1980) (ex-
plaining the conversion of Egyptian economic system from Capitalism to Socialism
and the accompanying establishment and development of Egyptian public sector).
46 Jennifer Bremer & Nabil Elias, Corporate Governance in Developing Econo-
mies: The Case of Egypt, 3 INT’L J. BUS. GOVERNANCE & ETHICS 432 (2007).  In
2008, CASE’s name was changed to the Egyptian Exchange (EGX).  See also Law
No. 95 of 1992, Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 22 June 1992 (Egypt).
47 Shahira Abel Shahid, Corporate Governance Is Becoming a Global Pursuit:
What Can Be Done in Egypt? 42 (Sept. 2001) (unpublished manuscript) http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/abstract=286875.
48 Id.
49 Minister of Economics and Foreign Trade Decree No. 135 of 1993 (Executive
Regulations of the Capital Market Law), Al-Jarida’ al-Rasmiyya, 8 Apr. 1993, vol.
81 F (Egypt).
50 CDL was amended by laws 143/2004, 10/2009 and 127/2009.
51 Executive Regulations were amended by Decrees No. 227/2002, 267/2002, 554/
2002 and 193/2005.
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ity.  Moreover, Decree No. 30 of 2002 of the former Capital Market
Authority’s Board of Directors defines the rules of listing and delisting
in the Egyptian Stock Exchange, which sets forth, inter alia, many dis-
closure requirements.52 This Section focuses on CML in particular and
refers to other statutes as needed.
3.1.1. Features of the Law
The Capital Market Law was intended to provide a comprehen-
sive regulatory basis to establish and sustain the development of an
efficient securities market.  By putting investor protection, trans-
parency, and fairness at the top of its priorities, the law aimed to en-
courage more investments.53  As a result, the CML regulated the
following areas of securities law:
Capital Market Commodities (securities): The First Part of
the CML regulates the issuance of the different types of securities, per-
mitting Egyptian corporations to issue bonds bearing competing inter-
est rates that exceed seven percent per annum for the first time.54  In
2008, wide scale amendments were introduced to encourage more in-
vestors.  For example, the minimum nominal value of shares in an IPO
was reduced from 5 EGP to 0.10 EGP.55
The First Part of the CML determines the requirements and
procedures of issuing securities, which starts by notifying the Egyp-
tian Financial Supervisory Authority (“EFSA”).56  If the EFSA does
not object within seven business days, the company may proceed with
issuing securities.57  This includes publishing a prospectus with spe-
cific information including the company purpose, term, and future
plans after the EFSA’s ratification. To guarantee continued trans-
parency, the law requires the issuing company to submit semi-annual
reports, prepared and revised by certified auditors, about its perform-
52 Listing Rules were amended by CMA Decision No. 94/2008 and EFSA Decisions
No. 50/2009, 64/2009, 67/2009 and 132/2010.
53 BAHAA ALI EL-DEAN, PRIVATIZATION AND THE CREATION OF A MARKET-BASED LE-
GAL SYSTEM: THE CASE OF EGYPT 39 (2002).
54 Although Egyptian Companies’ Law No. 159 of 1981 regulates the bonds’ issu-
ance, it did not permit corporations to issue bonds with interest rates exceeding
7% per annum, as this would violate the general rules of Egyptian law that sets
the interests rate ceiling in commercial transactions at 7% per annum. This practi-
cally prevented corporations from issuing bonds. See MOHAMED TANWIR ALRAFIE,
DOOR ALHYA’A AL’AMA LESOOK ALMAL FI HMAYT AKLYT ALMSHAHEMIN FI SHRKAT
ALMOSAHAMA [Role of the Capital Market Authority in Protecting Minority Share-
holders in Corporations] 24 (2006).
55 Law No. 95 of 1992 (Law of Capital Market), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 22 June
1992, vol. 25, art. 1/2 (Egypt).
56 Id. art. 2
57 Id. (the three week period was reduced to seven days in the 2008 amendments).
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ance.58 Furthermore, Article 8 of the CML requires the disclosure of
any transaction that may lead to a change in company control.
Stock Exchanges: In 2008, Article 16 of the CML, which sets
the framework of listing securities in Egyptian exchanges, was
amended, relegating the authority to regulate this issue to the Listing
Rules issued by the EFSA’s Board of Directors.59 The amendments dis-
tinguish between two types of listings.  The first type includes shares
of Egyptian corporations, provided they meet certain requirements as
stipulated in Article 9 of the Listing Rules,60 as well as other Egyptian
securities.61  The second type comprises foreign securities, provided
they are listed on other exchanges and satisfy the other listing require-
ments stipulated in Article 10 of the Listing Rules.62
Moreover, securities issued by companies with capital of less
than 50 million EGP may be listed on the Nilex exchange.63  Estab-
lished in accordance with Article 26 of the CML, Nilex is a special ex-
change that gives small and medium cap companies an opportunity to
raise capital with a regulatory environment designed specifically to
meet their needs.64
Transactions in listed securities are conducted exclusively in
the exchange where the traded securities are listed, and only through
licensed intermediary companies for a determined fee. EGX also an-
nounces transactions that occur on unlisted securities.65 Added in the
2008 amendments, Article 20 of the CML regulates insider trading, as
explained in the next section.  Moreover, the CML gives the EGX
Chairman the power to suspend transactions involving price manipu-
58 Id. arts. 4, 5.
59 Chairman of the Capital Market Authority Decree No. 30 of 2002 (defining the
rules of listing and delisting), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 18 June 2002 (Egypt).
60 Id.  art. 9 (requiring the following, inter alia, for the shares of each Egyptian
corporation to be listed: at least 10% of the shares must be offered, the number of
shareholders must not be less than 100 shareholders, holding at least 5% of the
total shares of the corporation, the number of issued shares required to be listed
must not be less than 2 million shares, and the company’s issued capital must be
equal to at least 20 million EGP and must be fully paid).
61 This includes securities issued by the government, bonds and other financing
instruments, and other forms of securities provided that they meet the listing
requirements.
62 See Decree No. 30 of 2002 art. 10.
63 This cap was increased from 25 million EGP to 50 million EGP by the EFSA’s
Decision No. 74 of 2010 (regarding the amendment of rules of listing and delist-
ing), on 7 June 2010.
64 See NILEX, http://nilex.egyptse.com/en/Listing_Requirements.aspx (last visited
Sept. 30, 2011).
65 Law No. 95 of 1992 (Law of Capital Market), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 22 June
1992, vol. 25, arts. 17, 18/2, 24 (Egypt).
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lation.66 The EGX Chairman may also take substantial procedures to
protect investors and the market if dangerous circumstances occur.67
Companies Operating in Securities: Part Three of the CML
provides a list of activities that are considered operations in securities.
Examples include companies marketing and executing initial public
offerings and venture capital initiatives.68 Only EFSA licensed compa-
nies may engage in such activities.69 A company must meet several
conditions related to the company structure, capital and management
to get the license.70  The EFSA may suspend the operations of a com-
pany if it violates the law or imposes a threat to investors or to the
market.71  The EFSA must then further approve and monitor the with-
drawal of a company from the market to assure that the company
meets its outstanding liabilities.  Additionally, this Part provides in
detail for the establishment and operation of investment funds and
securitization companies.72
The Capital Market Authority / EFSA:73 Until the EFSA’s
establishment in 2009, the CMA, established by the CML, was the au-
thority responsible for regulating and supervising the Egyptian capital
market. The CMA merged with other entities, ultimately forming the
EFSA.
Dispute Resolution: The CML created a “complaint” commit-
tee to hear complaints filed by parties affected by administrative deci-
sions of the Authority or the Minister of Investment.74  Filing a
complaint with this committee is a prerequisite for bringing a case
before the court.75 Moreover, the law stipulated that disputes arising
from CML application could only be settled by arbitration. In 2002,
however, these mandatory arbitration provisions were declared
unconstitutional.76
Sanctions: Until 2008, penalties prescribed in Part Six of the
CML for violating its provisions were non-deterrent and disproportion-
ate to the gravity of the violations.77  In 2008, the CML increased
66 Id. art. 21.
67 Id. arts. 22, 23.
68 Id. art. 27 (the Minister of Investment may add, and has actually added, other
activities over the years).
69 Id. art. 28.
70 Id. art. 29.
71 Id. arts. 30, 31.
72 Id. arts. 35-41.
73 Id. arts. 42-49.
74 Id. art. 50.
75 Id. art. 51.
76 Case no. 55/2002/Constitutional Court (Egypt).
77 See, e.g., ALI EL-DEAN, supra note 53, at 46 (criticizing the sanctions for several
reasons.  In determining the sanctions, the legislator prescribed a uniform sanc-
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these sanctions.78  For example, the CML raised monetary fines for
most violations from a maximum of fifty thousand or hundred thou-
sand EGP to twenty million EGP.79  These amendments make the
sanctions more proportionate to violations such as insider trading and
fraud.80  The law ties the initiation of criminal proceedings to the
EFSA’s Chairman’s demand and gives him the power to conciliate on
such crimes at any stage of the action, even during the punishment
execution,81 and even though it may jeopardize law enforcement.
3.1.2. Executive Regulations’ Crucial Role
Egypt’s CML enjoys a great deal of flexibility as a law.  The
CML’s provisions provide broad guidelines to regulate the different ar-
eas of securities law and to leave the details for secondary regula-
tions.82 This allows the government wide latitude to regulate a variety
of market activities by adding a new chapter or a few articles to its
executive regulations through a Ministerial Decree, rather than hav-
ing to amend the law through the Parliament.83 This method of legis-
lation is fast and easy, but has many disadvantages.  Legislating
through executive regulations as secondary statutes jeopardizes proce-
dural and objective guarantees offered by the law making process of a
statute issued by Parliament.84 Because executive regulations are nec-
tion for all breaches other than insider trading, assuming that different offenses
have the same impact on the market and that insider trading has a less impact
than the other offenses).
78 See Law No. 123 of 2008 (amending the Law of Capital Market); see also MINIS-
TRY OF INVESTMENT, FINANCING REFORM PROGRAM, http://www.investment.gov.eg/
en/NBFS/CapitalMarket/Pages/Financialprogram.aspx (last visited Nov. 12,
2011).
79 Law No. 95 of 1992 (Law of Capital Market), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 22 June
1992, vol. 25, arts. 63, 64 (Egypt).
80 Id. arts. 63-69.
81 Id. art. 69 (unless the EFSA’s Chairman requests the initiation of criminal ac-
tion against the violators, they will not be charged with any violations. In this
sense, the law gives the EFSA’s Chairman an exclusive authority to initiate crimi-
nal actions against any violations criminalized in the CML).
82 Id.
83 This explains the consecutive large number of amendments of the CML’s execu-
tive regulations in the last few years by Ministerial Decrees No. 46/2004, 192/
2005, 1/2006, 14/2006, 139/2006, 140/2006, 141/2006, 301/2006, 314/2006, 84/2007,
12/2007, 126/2008 and others. See ALRAFIE, supra note 54, at 23-25 (discussing the
features of CML and describing flexibility as one of the most significant features of
that law).
84 On the one hand, procedural guarantees include drafting of the first bill by spe-
cialized professionals, then revising it by a competent Parliamentary committee,
and finally submitting it to a Parliamentary debate. On the other hand, objective
guarantees include issuing an explanatory memorandum, which provides guide-
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essary for the application of statutes, they are only valid insofar as
they do not contradict the main statute.85 Furthermore, executive reg-
ulations may not add to, amend, or disable the provisions of the stat-
ute for which they are issued.86 Therefore, adding a chapter to the
executive regulations to manage an area of the law that exceeds the
scope of what was originally statutorily regulated is considered adding
to the law and raises doubts about such regulations’ validity.
The Egyptian government has increasingly used executive reg-
ulations to govern different areas of the capital market. For instance,
the government added several activities related to securities, such as
regulating the buying of securities with margin, borrowing securities
for sale,87 and securitization.88  Executive regulations have also set
forth rules banning the manipulation of prices and insider trading in
its Eleventh Part.89 Furthermore, executive regulations presented the
first comprehensive takeover regulation in Egypt in 2007.90 The im-
portance of executive regulations in securities is clear, however, the
excessive use of secondary statutes in regulating the capital market
raises legitimate fears about the law’s quality and validity.91
3.2. Institutional Framework: EFSA
The Egyptian Parliament issued Law No. 10 in 2009, establish-
ing the EFSA by merging all entities involved with non-banking finan-
cial markets.92 Replacing, inter alia, the CMA,93 the EFSA became the
lines to help the drafters of the executive regulations, the practitioners and the
court to understand the law and capture the intent of the articles therein.
85 See ABDUL-AZIZ, supra note 8.
86 Case no. 528/1975/ Court of Cassation (Egypt).
87 See Ministerial Decree No. 48 of 2007 (Regulating Buying Securities with Mar-
gin and Borrowing Securities for Sale), Al-Waqa’i’ al-Misriyah, 22 Mar. 2007, vol.
66 (Egypt).
88 See Ministerial Decree No. 46 of 2004 (Regulating the Securitization Activity),
Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 18 Nov. 2004, vol. 260 (Sup.) (Egypt).
89 See Ministerial Decree No. 141 of 2006 (Regarding the addition of Rules Ban-
ning the Manipulation of Prices and Exploiting Insider Information), Al-Waqa’i’
al-Misriyah, 29 Apr. 2006, vol. 93 (Egypt).
90 See Ministerial Decree No. 12 of 2007 (Regulating Acquisitions Through Tender
Offers), Al-Waqa’i’ al-Misriyah, 4 Feb. 2007, vol. 26 (Egypt).
91 See Ahmad A. Alshorbagy, Orascom Telecom versus France Telecom: A Case
Study on Egyptian Takeover Law, 20 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 157 (2011).
92 Law No. 10 of 2009 (Regulating Non-Banking Financial Markets and Instru-
ments), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 1 Mar. 2009, vol. 9 (Egypt).
93 Id. art. 3 (“The Authority shall replace the Egyptian Insurance Supervisory Au-
thority, the Capital Market Authority, and the Mortgage Finance Authority in en-
forcing the provisions of the Insurance Supervision and Control Law no. 10 of
1981, the Capital Market Law no. 95 of 1992, the Depository and Central Registry
Law no. 93 of 2000, the Mortgage Finance Law no. 148 of 2001, as well as any
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major supervisor of non-banking financial markets and instruments
including capital markets, derivative markets, insurance activities,
mortgage finance, financial leasing, and factoring and securitization.94
As a unified public authority, the EFSA harmonizes financial market
regulation to ensure better supervision and more orderly markets.95
The EFSA is a public reporting authority and is attached to the
Ministry of Investment as the law stipulates.96 Although EFSA has
the power to decide most matters presented to it, it must obtain ap-
proval from the Minister of Investment for some of its decisions. For
instance, when incorporators form a corporation,97 a Ministerial De-
cree forms an evaluation committee of in kind shares upon the EFSA
chairman’s referral. This limits the EFSA’s role to merely suggesting a
course of action rather than actually rendering a binding decision.98
Nevertheless, political and governmental influences are the
real concern of the EFSA’s subordination. The method of choosing and
appointing the EFSA’s board members also jeopardizes its indepen-
dence. Because all EFSA’s board members are appointed by the same
method and authority – the Prime Minister upon the recommendation
of the Minister of Investment – factors other than competence, like the
individuals political affiliation, may affect board member nomina-
tions.99 This, coupled with their four years renewable term, can also
prejudice the judgment of board members who want to keep their
positions.100
other related laws and decrees that are part of the mandates of the above authori-
ties. The Authority shall be considered the competent administrative body entitled
to enforce the financial leasing provisions promulgated by Law no. 95 of 1995.”).
94 Id. art. 2.
95 Id. art. 4(a) (“The Authority shall maintain the safety, stability, organization
and development of non-banking financial markets, and balance the market deal-
ers rights. In addition, the Authority shall provide means and systems, and issue
rules and regulations to guarantee the efficiency of non-banking financial markets
and ensure transparency of activities undertaken.”).
96 Id. art. 1(a).
97 Establishing a public corporation under the Egyptian law requires going
through several procedures, all of which fall under the following steps: drafting
the articles of association and the charter of incorporation, subscribing, paying
certain percentage of the nominal value of shares, inviting the founding assembly,
the approval of the competent committee in the EFSA, the approval of the compe-
tent Minister and finally notarizing and registering the company. See MOSTAFA K.
TAHA, ALSHRKAT ALTEGARIA [Commercial Companies] 145-84 (1998).
98 ALRAFIE, supra note 54, at 23.
99 Despite the multi-partisan political system, the National Democratic Party,
controlled by influential businessmen, practically dominated all aspects of political
life in Egypt before the January Revolution.
100 The board formation could be enhanced. Lessons could be discerned from the
organization of the French Autorite´ Des Marche´s Financiers (Financial Market
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In pursuit of its objectives, the EFSA enjoys powerful author-
ity.101  Its authority falls under one of three categories: 1) license its
activities to regulate the non-banking financial market; 2) inspect li-
censed entities, monitor market transparency, and disseminate infor-
mation to effectively supervise the market; and 3) develop the non-
banking financial market to enable communication and cooperation
with similar foreign authorities.102 The EFSA’s authority extends over
Authority – AMF) and the American Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Both the AMF and the SEC employ different strategies to ensure and sustain their
independency, whether by dispersing the appointing authority of the members in
France or by assuring that the commission remains non-partisan in the United
States. Additionally, the wider formation of the board is an advantage due to the
better representation and more experiences it allows. Having a staggered board is
also urged to ease the transfer of powers from one board to another without shak-
ing the stability of the authority.
101 See generally EGYPTIAN FINANCIAL SUPERVISING AUTHORITY, http://www.efsa.
gov.eg/content/efsa2_en/efsa2_merge_about_en/efsa2_merge_efsa_en.htm#1 (last
visited Sept. 12, 2011) (providing more details on the EFSA).
102 Presidential Decree No. 192/2009 (establishing the EFSA Charter), Al-Jarida
Al-Rasmiyya, 14 June 2009, vol. 24, art. 4 (Egypt).  The Decree enumerated the
following list of authorities:
1. Licensing non-banking financial activities.
2. Inspecting entities licensed to operate in non-banking fi-
nancial activities.
3. Overseeing the dissemination of non-banking financial
markets-related information.
4. Ensuring transparency and competitiveness in rendering
non-banking financial services through the proper control of
non-banking financial markets.
5. Protecting and balancing non-banking market participants’
rights
6. Taking necessary measures to limit market manipulation
and fraud, taking into consideration the potential commer-
cial risks relevant to that market.
7. Supervising training of non-banking market staffs and en-
hance their efficiency.
8. Communicating, cooperating and coordinating with other
non-banking regulatory bodies abroad, which leads to the
development of the means of supervision of non-banking fi-
nancial markets.
9. Communicating, cooperating and coordinating with socie-
ties and organizations, which regulate the operation of fi-
nancial supervision authorities across the globe, thus
empowering the Authority to assume its competencies ac-
cording to the best international practices.
10. Contributing to disseminating financial investment culture
and awareness.
58 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 11:1
all capital market participants, including public corporations, interme-
diary companies, and investors.103  Due to both the complexity of laws
and regulations dealing with the capital market and then to EFSA’s
nascence, however, EFSA’s staff still lack in experience, rendering
them less than fully competent.104  Like the EFSA, the Egyptian Ex-
change (“EGX”) plays an important role in enforcing listing rules and
disclosure requirements.105
3.3. Reforming Securities Regulations
Before discussing the CML’s reform proposal, it is crucial to
examine the reasons of its current inefficiency and the effect of the
January Revolution on the Egyptian capital market. This will help de-
termine today’s needs and the underlying purpose of the reform.
3.3.1. Examining the Egyptian Market
The Egyptian stock market dropped sharply following the
eruption of the Revolution, incurring large losses in the two days it
remained open—it then stayed closed until March 23.106  The Revolu-
tion shook investor’s confidence in the Egyptian market, especially for-
eign investors.  Given the negative impact on the Egyptian economy as
a whole and the continuing political instability, a liquidity problem is
Id.
103 ALRAFIE, supra note 54, at 36.
104 For example, the contradiction in the EFSA’s behavior over the course of the
Mobinil case, the most recent takeover case in Egypt, reflects a deep misunder-
standing of the regulations and randomness of its interpretation. See generally
Dispute over ownership of Egypt’s Mobinil, REUTERS (Apr. 10, 2010), http://www.
reuters.com/article/idUSLDE63906K20100410 (describing in greater detail the
facts of the Mobinil Case). It is worth mentioning that a group of investors re-
ported EFSA’s Chairman along with former EGX Chairman to the Egyptian Pub-
lic Prosecutor (General Attorney) on the eight’s of July 2010, accusing them of
destroying the national economy and charging them with the deterioration of
EGX. A week later following this event, the latter was removed from his position
after four years in service. See Ahmed Chalabi & Abdul Rahman Shalabi, Prosecu-
tor Starts Probe Into Reports of Abuse of Public Funds in the Stock Market,
ARABNET (July 13, 2010), http://www.almasry-alyoum.com/article2.aspx?Article
ID=262362.
105 EGX is the authority attributed with enforcing the Listing Rules and ensuring
companies’ compliance with them. In this regard, EGX has the power to suspend
and delist non-complying companies. See infra.
106 See Nikhil Lohade, Political Strife Roils Egypt’s Markets, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 26,
2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487032932045761058523670
08580.html; see also THE EGYPTIAN EXCH., EGX RESUMES TRADING ON WEDNESDAY
(Mar. 23, 2011), http://www.egyptse.com/English/newsdetails.aspx?NewsID=924
76.
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to be expected too.  In these two aspects, Egypt’s economic crisis is sim-
ilar to that of Greece.107 Additionally, preexisting corruption and the
inefficiencies of the CML and EFSA have affected the Egyptian capital
market.
The purpose of reforming securities regulations in Egypt is to
restore investors’ confidence in the Egyptian markets.  Furthermore,
resolving the existing flaws in the law and its enforcement should at-
tract new categories of investors, such as middle class investors. Mid-
dle class investors were reluctant to invest in the Egyptian capital
market either from fear of corruption or due to lack of transparency.
Attracting new categories of investors will compensate for some of the
investors who left the Egyptian market, and will introduce new
sources of cash flows that can reduce the expected liquidity problem.
3.3.2. Reform Proposals
This section proposes reforms to some areas of securities law in
the light of the previous discussion about the purpose of the desired
reforms.
3.3.2.1. Disclosure
Currently, the disclosure rules are scattered among different
regulations.  For example, the CML requires the subscription prospec-
tus of any incorporating company to disclose certain information relat-
ing to the company’s purpose, its capital, its incorporators or previous
shareholders, and its future plans.108  CML also requires each corpora-
tion to present a semi-annual report, supported by documents, to the
EFSA summarizing its activities, performance, and describing its fi-
nancial status.109
In addition, the Listing Rules impose the largest part of disclo-
sure requirements.110  Articles 13 and 14 of the Listing Rules define
the scope of disclosure by limiting it to necessary and document sup-
107 Abdul-Rahman Shalaby, EFSA Demands the Continuity of the Exchange’s Clo-
sure Until the Election of a Civil Authority, Almasy Alyoum (mentioning that al-
though Greece’s crisis is in essence a debt crisis, it is similar to Egypt’s crisis in
two aspects. Both crises have shacked investor confidence in the economy, and
have caused a liquidity problem. He further explains that Greece did not start
recovering from its crisis except with the assistance of a great European subsidy,
which contributed to restoring the confidence in their economy and solved the li-
quidity problem.).
108 Law No. 95 of 1992 (Law of Capital Market), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 22 June
1992, vol. 25, art. 5 (Egypt).
109 Id. arts. 6,7.
110 See Chairman of the Capital Market Authority Decree No. 30 of 2002 (defining
the rules of listing and delisting), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 18 June 2002, arts. 12-
19 (Egypt).
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ported information that does not affect the company’s stability.111
Furthermore, the Listing Rules require the board of directors of any
listed company to present an annual report that summarizes the con-
tracts and agreements between the company and any of its subsidiar-
ies or any other related party.112  The rules also require the company
to disclose any fundamental changes in information initially filed in
the listing prospectus.113  The Stock Exchange publishes this disclosed
information once received.114
Although disclosure is adequately regulated, disclosure re-
quirements are not fully complied with.  The problem with disclosure
is two-fold.  First, Egyptian investors did not understand the purpose
of disclosure requirements.115 Concerns arose as some legal literature
discussed how transparency and disclosure requirements impinge
company and controlling shareholder privacy.116 Furthermore, the
high concentration of ownership in Egyptian corporations has ampli-
fied this problem.  Controlling shareholders feel that they own the
whole corporation, and that the disclosure rules require them to dis-
close personal wealth information.  This Egyptian investor mentality,
coupled with weakly applied EFSA and EGX law enforcement mecha-
nisms, has led to long-term non-compliance with the disclosure
requirements.
Fortunately, awareness of the importance of corporate govern-
ance practices, including disclosure, arose in the last few years. Since
2004, the law imposes daily fines for delays in submitting financial
statements.117 In 2008, the penalties of noncompliance with disclosure
requirements were significantly increased from a maximum of 50,000
EGP to a maximum of one million EGP.118 EGX has also taken stricter
measures in enforcing the law.  In 2009, EGX suspended the activities
on shares of twenty-nine corporations that were not in compliance
with the latest Listing Rules.119  This was followed by a massive wave
of delisting of companies that failed to adjust to the new rules within
the prescribed period.120 While financial disclosure has improved sig-
111 Id. arts. 13, 14.
112 Id. art. 17
113 Id. art.18.
114 Id. art. 12/2.
115 ALI EL-DEAN, supra note 53, at 43.
116 Id.; see also ALRAFIE, supra note 54, at 506.
117 Law No. 95 of 1992 (Law of Capital Market), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 22 June
1992, vol. 25, art. 67 (Egypt).
118 Id. art. 65.
119 THE EGYPTIAN EXCH., 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 16 (2010).
120 Id. (“The number of listed companies continued to decrease, reaching 306 com-
panies at the end of 2009, down from 373 at the end of 2008, owing to EGX effec-
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nificantly over the years, non-financial disclosure in areas like corpo-
rate structure or governance remains largely inadequate.121
The problem with disclosure is not related to the inadequacy of
the rule, but rather with its compliance. Improved compliance is cru-
cial. Though delisting non-complying corporations enhanced disclosure
practices, it has consequently led to a decline in market capitaliza-
tion.122  Thus, educating investors, assisting corporations, and provid-
ing them with incentives to comply with the disclosure requirements
are the best means to improve disclosure practices.
3.3.2.2. Insider Trading
Until 2006, a single article regulated insider trading, which im-
posed largely insufficient penalties on violators.123 The Eleventh Part
was then added to the CML’s executive regulations, regulating price
manipulation practices and insider trading.124 This new Part added
clarity by defining terms like insider, insider information, and mate-
rial information.125 It also widened the scope of prohibition on using
and benefitting from insider information, and expressly raised viola-
tors’ civil and criminal liability.126 Moreover, the Listing Rule’s 2009
amendment sets a blackout period for an insider that extends up to 15
days before and 3 days after the issuance or publication of any mate-
rial information.127 Penalties on violators were raised to at least two
tive policy in enforcing listing, disclosure and corporate governance rules on
issuers.”).
121 THE WORLD BANK, REPORT ON THE OBSERVANCE OF STANDARDS AND CODES
(ROSC): A CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT FOR THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF
EGYPT 13 (June 2009) (mentioning for example that the remuneration policy for
board members was disclosed only by 13 percent of EGX-30 companies – which
contains the largest thirty listed companies – in 2007, 16 percent disclosed their
governance structure such as the board level committees and only three percent
disclosed policies with respect to their internal audit, internal control, and exter-
nal audit process).
122 THE EGYPTIAN EXCH., 2010 QUARTERLY REPORT 10 (Jan.-Mar. 2010).
123 Law No. 95 of 1992 (Law of Capital Market), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 22 June
1992, vol. 25, art. 64 (Egypt). Before the article was amended in 2008, persons who
were found guilty of insider trading were punished by at least two year of impris-
onment and/or a fine that does not exceed 50,000 EGP, which is less than 10,000
USD.
124 Minister of Economics and Foreign Trade Decree No. 135 of 1993 (Executive
Regulations of the Capital Market Law), Al-Jarida’ al-Rasmiyya, 8 Apr. 1993, vol.
81 F., pt. 11 (Egypt).
125 Id. art. 319.
126 Id. arts. 318, 322, 323.
127 See Chairman of the Capital Market Authority Decree No. 30 of 2002 (defining
the rules of listing and delisting), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 18 June 2002, art. 19
(Egypt).
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years imprisonment and/or up to twenty million EGP.128 These
amendments and measures have decreased the insider trading that
the Capital Market Authority recognized as an immense problem a
few years ago.129 Most market participants recognize insider trading
as an “ongoing, albeit diminishing” issue.130
While the enhanced insider trading regulation is essential to
its elimination, unmitigated impediments include corruption, lack of
EFSA and EGX independence, and impaired law enforcement.  Many
hope that reforms following the January Revolution will overcome
these impediments and achieve new levels of equality and trans-
parency in the Egyptian capital market.  Improved disclosure practices
provide more transparency to market participants, and therefore con-
tributes to solving the insider trading problem.
3.3.2.2.1. Price Manipulation
As with insider trading, price manipulation was regulated by a
general CML provision that gave the Stock Exchange Chairman the
power to suspend manipulative transactions.131 Fines, comparably
trivial to the violations’ market impact, were used to punish certain
forms of price manipulation.132 The CML’s executive regulations, how-
ever, regulated price manipulation more comprehensively in 2006.133
The Eleventh Part of the executive regulations defines price
manipulation and gives several examples of manipulative practices,
including acts that were not criminalized before.134 These now illegal
acts include spreading rumors and performing transactions on a cer-
tain security to create delusionary circulation and artificially raise its
128 Law No. 95 of 1992 (Law of Capital Market), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 22 June
1992, vol. 25, art. 64 (Egypt).
129 THE WORLD BANK, REPORT ON THE OBSERVANCE OF STANDARDS AND CODES
(ROSC): A CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT FOR THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF
EGYPT 7 (Mar. 2004).
130 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 121, at 19.
131 Law No. 95 of 1992 (Law of Capital Market), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 22 June
1992, vol. 25, art. 21 (Egypt).
132 For example, disclosing incorrect information in the prospectus or in the com-
pany’s records. See Law No. 95 of 1992 (Law of Capital Market), Al-Jarida Al-
Rasmiyya, 22 June 1992, vol. 25 , art. 63/3-5 (Egypt).
133 Minister of Economics and Foreign Trade Decree No. 135 of 1993 (Executive
Regulations of the Capital Market Law), Al-Jarida’ al-Rasmiyya, 8 Apr. 1993, vol.
81 F., pt. 11 (Egypt).
134 Id. art. 319 (defining price manipulation as any action or abstention aiming at
influencing the price of securities that would harm all or some of the investors in
the securities market).
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price.135  The Listing Rules also prohibit spreading any undocumented
information that does not conform to the reality of the corporation.136
As a further deterrent, the law increased fines on violators from a
maximum of one hundred thousand EGP to twenty million EGP.137
Furthermore, the law holds the actual corporation manager, in most
cases the controlling shareholder, personally liable for violations com-
mitted by his corporation.138
Improving the regulation of price manipulation in the Egyptian
capital markets reduced the prevalence of such practices. The underly-
ing problem of price manipulation, however, is not its lack of regula-
tion, but market supervision and law enforcement. This can be
improved by granting the EFSA more independence and by applying
the law equally to all investors—which necessarily requires develop-
ing more means to battle corruption.
3.3.2.2.2. Takeovers139
Takeovers rarely occurred in Egypt until recently.140  “The in-
creasing number of mergers and acquisitions in the banking, commu-
nication, and construction sectors,”141 led the Egyptian government to
135 Id. arts. 319(a), 321; see also ALRAFIE, supra note 54, at 553 (demonstrating the
shortage of CML in regulating price manipulation before it was regulated in the
executive regulations. An example of a form of price manipulation that was not
previously criminalized occurred in the Egyptian stock markets when two specula-
tors, by switching their roles from buyers to sellers every other day, increased the
share value of the Egyptian British Bank by five percent daily from 80 EGP to 210
EGP. The Minister of Economy was recalled before the Egyptian Parliament be-
cause of this incident, who asserted that the two speculators benefited from the
vulnerability of the law. The two speculators were not punished.).
136 Chairman of the Capital Market Authority Decree No. 30 of 2002 (defining the
rules of listing and delisting), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 18 June 2002, art. 13
(Egypt).
137 Law No. 95 of 1992 (Law of Capital Market), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 22 June
1992, vol. 25, art. 63/3 (Egypt).
138 Id. art. 68.
139 See Alshorbagy, supra note 91.
140 Abdel Shahid, supra note 47, at 14.
141 Alshorbagy, supra note 91, at 157 n.3 (“In the last decade, mergers and acqui-
sitions deals have increasingly taken place in the Egyptian market. Takeovers
soared in 2008 mounting to almost 20% of the total value of trade in that year.
Takeovers decreased in2009 partially because of the effect of the universal finan-
cial crisis, as revealed in the following table:
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regulate takeovers for the first time in 2007.142  Unfortunately, the
government chose to regulate takeovers by issuing secondary regula-
tions rather than by drafting statutes, for example, by adding a new
part to the CML executive regulations.143 While this accelerated the
regulatory process and provided more legal flexibility, the many issues
of using secondary regulations to govern takeovers have negated its
benefits because of their inefficiencies.144
The Egyptian takeover regulations largely adopted the Euro-
pean takeover approach. Similar to the European takeover law,145 the
Egyptian takeover regime features a mandatory tender offer rule.146
The mandatory tender offer requires anyone seeking control over a
target corporation to launch a tender offer to purchase all the out-
standing shares of the target corporation at the highest price an ac-
quirer paid in a tender offer during the previous twelve months.147
Furthermore, the non-frustration rule prohibits target corporations in
Egypt from committing any action that may be considered a “signifi-
cant detrimental event” that may hinder the completion of the tender
Year Number of Deals Total Value* Total Market Trade* Percentage
2006 42 39 287 13.5%
2007 28 37 363 10.2%
2008 28 105 530 19.8%
2009 11 42 448 9.4%
*Values are represented in billions of EGP.)
See THE EGYPTIAN EXCH., 2009 ANNUAL REPORT (2010); THE EGYPTIAN EXCH., 2008
ANNUAL REPORT (2009); THE EGYPTIAN EXCH., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT (2008); THE
EGYPTIAN EXCH., 2006 ANNUAL REPORT (2007), http://www.egyptse.com/English/
services_reports.aspx.
142 See Taher S. Mo’emn, AL’ISTHWATH A’LA ALSHARIKA: DRASA NTHRIA WA
TATBIKIA [Acquiring the Company: A Theoretical and Empirical Study] 63-64
(2009) (discussing two of the most prominent deals in the building materials and
construction sector and their significant effect on the Egyptian market).
143 Minister of Economics and Foreign Trade Decree No. 135 of 1993 (Executive
Regulations of the Capital Market Law), Al-Jarida’ al-Rasmiyya, 8 Apr. 1993, vol.
81 F., pt. 12 (Egypt).
144 Alshorbagy, supra note 91, at 166.
145 Directive 2004/25, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 Apr.
2004 on Takeover Bids, arts. 12, 23, 2004 O.J. (L 142) (EC).
146 See Alshorbagy, supra note 91, at 162.
147 Minister of Economics and Foreign Trade Decree No. 135 of 1993 (Executive
Regulations of the Capital Market Law), Al-Jarida’ al-Rasmiyya, 8 Apr. 1993, vol.
81 F., arts. 353-56 (Egypt); Directive 2004/25, of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 21 Apr. 2004 on Takeover Bids, art. 25, 2004 O.J. (L 142) (EC); see
also Alshorbagy, supra note 91, at 162-66 (explaining the mandatory tender offer
requirement and examining its points of weakness including the inefficiency of the
price determination mechanism of the mandatory tender offer).
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offer as the law defines.148 This rule extends from the time that the
decision approving the tender offer is published until the deal’s conclu-
sion.149 The regulations, however, do not impose a breakthrough rule
on target corporations that prohibit its board of directors from adopt-
ing general pre-bid defensive tactics – such as “poison pills” – against
prospective bidders as required under the European Directive on
takeovers.150
The executive regulations governing takeovers have several
substantive shortcomings not limited to threats of illegality and un-
constitutionality.151  The Egyptian regulations omitted the break-
through rule, which is an integral part of the European scheme.152
This omission is a problematic because it renders the non-frustration
rule futile.  Moreover, because the language employed in the Egyptian
regulations is so poorly drafted, it suggests a different meaning than
that originally intended.  For example, the method to determine the
mandatory tender price offer demonstrates these problems.153
148 Minister of Economics and Foreign Trade Decree No. 135 of 1993 (Executive
Regulations of the Capital Market Law), Al-Jarida’ al-Rasmiyya, 8 Apr. 1993, vol.
81 F., art. 326 (Egypt) (defining a significant detrimental event as “any expected
event arising after launching the offer that would have a negative effect on the
target company, its business or the share value.” Specifically, Article 343 expressly
mentions two examples of detrimental events. The first is increasing the target
capital, or issuing new convertible bonds if such an increase would make the ac-
quisition difficult or impossible. The second example is a broad one that covers any
action, which would detrimentally impact the target’s assets or increase its
obligations).
149 Id. art. 343; Directive 2004/25, of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 21 Apr. 2004 on Takeover Bids, art. 9, 2004 O.J. (L 142) (EC).
150 See Directive 2004/25, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21
Apr. 2004 on Takeover Bids, art. 11, 2004 O.J. (L 142) (EC); see also Alshorbagy,
supra note 91, at 166 (discussing the board passivity rules under the Egyptian
Takeover regulations and explaining the inefficiency of dropping the breakthrough
rule from the regulations).
151 See Directive 2004/25, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21
Apr. 2004 on Takeover Bids, arts, 14, 15, 2004 O.J. (L 142) (EC). Originally, take-
overs were barely regulated in the CML, which means that by regulating take-
overs, the CML’s executive regulations may have added to the law. This raises
many doubts about the validity of the new regulations.
152 See Marco Ventoruzzo, Europe’s Thirteenth Directive and U.S. Takeover Regu-
lations: Regulatory Means and Political and Economic Ends, 41 TEX. INT’L L. J.
171, 200 (2006) (explaining the breakthrough rule).
153 Minister of Economics and Foreign Trade Decree No. 135 of 1993 (Executive
Regulations of the Capital Market Law), Al-Jarida’ al-Rasmiyya, 8 Apr. 1993, vol.
81 F., art. 354 (Egypt) (requiring the price of the mandatory tender offer to be as
high as the highest price paid by the acquirer, or any of its affiliates, in a previous
tender offer during the 12 months preceding the tender offer in question. However,
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Because of these inefficiencies, Egyptian takeover regulations
generally discourage takeovers. The mandatory tender offer require-
ment inevitably increases the takeover price.  Moreover, the all-cash
rule, which requires the consideration for the transaction to be paid in
cash, makes it harder for any potential acquirer to succeed.154  The
breakthrough rule’s omission can often lead the acquirer poorly posi-
tioned under Egyptian takeover rules because the incumbent now con-
trols pre-bid defensive measures that make it unlikely for any
potential raider to succeed in a company takeover.155
The regulations’ negative effect also extends to the company’s
minority shareholders, as they do not have adequate protection. By
discouraging takeovers, the regulations favor the interests of incum-
bent controlling shareholders over those of minority shareholders.156
“Although the regulations guarantee minority shareholders a fair exit
strategy if a takeover attempt is successful, the protection is negated
by the great unlikelihood of a successful hostile takeover.”157
To summarize, securities regulation in Egypt has vastly devel-
oped over the past few years. Legal and institutional changes have en-
hanced the Egyptian CML either by amending inefficient provisions or
by adding new provisions to address legislative gaps and regulate new
areas of the law.  It is fair to say that the current CML in Egypt is a
substantively good law in general, however, it is not very well organ-
ized.  The same topic is sometimes dealt with in different places and
regulations, which makes it difficult for investors to understand the
law.  Moreover, a few parts of the law need to be improved, for exam-
ple, the regulation of takeovers.  Also, some topics addressed in the
executive regulations need to be incorporated in the statute itself to
avoid any doubts about its validity.
The main concern about CML is regarding its enforcement. The
EFSA, as the capital market’s main supervisor, should be granted
more independence by stating expressly in the law that it is an institu-
tion independent from the government and enhancing the board’s for-
mation.  This will allow the EFSA to exercise its discretion freely and
will guarantee that its decisions be unbiased.  Eventually this will also
lead to applying the law equally to all investors, curbing the effects of
corruption. The non-compliance of market participants is sometimes
attributed to the lack of awareness of the importance of corporate gov-
ernance.  It is thus equally important to focus the reform endeavors on
the article neglects the case where no previous tender offer exists, despite it is the
case that is more likely to occur.).
154 Id. art. 358.
155 Alshorbagy, supra note 91, at 166.
156 Id.
157 Id.
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educating market participants of the importance of complying with the
law.  Achieving higher levels of transparency, fairness and accounta-
bility will raise confidence in the Egyptian capital markets, allay the
anxiety of current investors, and attract new investors.
4. INVESTMENT
4.1. History and Development of Investment in Egypt
President Gamal Abdel-Nasser, from 1952 to 1970, adopted na-
tionalism as an economic policy and promoted the role of the public
sector in developing the economy.158  This resulted in only temporary
economic development because of unrealistic development programs
and bureaucratic policies.159  Economic laws in this era were concen-
trating on developing agriculture, confiscating property, governing
and organizing public companies, controlling prices, nationalizing
laws, and other similar efforts.160
President Al-Sadat, 1970 to 1981, transformed economic policy
from a public sector based economy to a private sector based economy,
adopting the “Open Door Policy,”161 which aimed to liberalize trade
and free the economy.162  The Open Door Policy failed, however, be-
cause the main sources of Egyptian revenue, including the Suez Canal
dues, the oil industry, and leveraging the political location of Egypt,
stayed under the public sector’s control.163  Also, Egypt’s external debt
increased due to the extensive import of goods.164  The Egyptian GDP,
nevertheless, registered high scores due to services produced, rather
than economic production and trade.165  In other words, the revenue
obtained from the Suez Canal and similar sources of income and the
return of exporting labor to the Gulf region helped to increase the
Egyptian GDP.166  Thereafter, a Gulf area recession caused Egyptians
working in the Gulf area to return to Egypt causing loss to the Egyp-
tian economy.167  President Mubarak, from 1981 to 2011, made use of
Egypt’s geopolitical position in the Middle East for Egypt’s benefit.
For instance, the Egyptian government received subsidies in return for
enhancing the American role in the Middle East.168 Economic laws
158 MARAT TERTEROV, DOING BUSINESS WITH EGYPT 9 (2001).
159 Abu-Odeh, supra note 40, at 359.
160 Id. at 357-58.
161 TERTEROV, supra note 158, at 4.
162 Id. at 9.
163 Abu-Odeh, supra note 40, at 360.
164 Id. at 361.
165 TERTEROV, supra note 158, at 11.
166 Id.
167 Abu-Odeh, supra note 40, at 360.
168 Id. at 362.
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during Mubarak’s era concentrated on foreign direct investment, cor-
porate, telecommunications, imports and exports, competition, free
tariffs zones, and industrial cities laws.169
The main sources of Egyptian economy are from Suez Canal
dues, tourism, the gas industry, and remittances from expatriates
working abroad.170  Aside from industry and agriculture, trade lies
heavily as one of the primary Egyptian economic activities.171  Accord-
ing to the World Bank’s 2008 estimation, Egyptian exports of goods
and services mount to 53,277 million USD, while imports of goods and
services are 63,086 million USD,172 Egypt’s main imports are agricul-
tural products, food components, medicines, metal industrial compo-
nents and their primary exports are oil and cotton.173  Egypt’s main
trade partners include the United States, China, the United Kingdom,
Spain, Germany, Syria, and Saudi Arabia.174
The main investment tools in the Egyptian market include: 1)
privatization, 2) build-own-operate-transfer (BOT) projects, 3)
franchising, and 4) investment legal incentives.175  The Egyptian gov-
ernment started moving toward putting an end to the country’s mo-
nopoly over the industrial and investment sector and encouraging
private investment in 1999.176  Privatization included sectors such as
construction, tourism, transportation, and finance.177  The Egyptian
government also started encouraging BOT projects in different sectors
such as infrastructure in 1999.178  Egypt is considered the franchising
center of the Middle East, whose value has grown to over 14 billion
169 Id. at 365.
170 GIL FEILER, THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
MENT & BUSINESS LAW 46-49 (2000).
171 Id. at 47-49.
172 THE WORLD BANK, EGYPT: COUNTRY DATA PROFILE, http://ddp-ext.worldbank.
org/ext/ddpreports/ViewSharedReport?REPORT_ID=9147&REQUEST_TYPE=
VIEWADVANCED (last visited Nov. 14, 2011).
173 FEILER, supra note 170, at 49.
174 INT’L FRANCHISE ASS’N, COUNTRY FACT SHEET: EGYPT, http://franchise.org/
IndustrySecondary.aspx?id=45590 (last visted Nov. 11, 2011).  For instance, the
Egyptian market is the fourth exporter of American products in the Middle East
and one of the most important importers of specific American products such as
agricultural equipments and products. Also the United States is the second big-
gest foreign investor in the Egyptian market. U.S. COMMERCIAL SERV., DOING BUS-
INESS IN EGYPT: 2010 COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE FOR U.S. COMPANIES, http://
www.franchise.org/uploadedFiles/Franchise_Industry/International_Develop-
ment/Country_Profiles/Egypt_2010%20CCG.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2011).
175 FEILER, supra note 170, at 49-55.
176 Id. at 49.
177 Id. at 50.
178 Id. at 53.
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USD.179  President Al-Sadat’s 1973 “open door” policy opened the door
for franchising.180  Around forty international franchisors are cur-
rently investing in Egypt; twenty-five in the food sector and fifteen in
other franchising sectors.181  In the last decade, Egypt adopted new
laws, regulations, and introduced several amendments to promote in-
vestment and enhance production.  The best example of this is the In-
vestment Law Incentives No. 8 of 1997, discussed below.182
4.2. Investment Law Incentives No. 8 of 1997 (“ILI”)
Scope of application: The ILI provides incentives, guarantees
and benefits in case of investing in specific fields.183  The list of these
fields embodied in the ILI is not exclusive and the Cabinet can add
other fields and activities.184  Examples of included fields are: recla-
mation and cultivation of desert, animals and fish production, mining
works, hotels and motels, tourists’ transportation, transportation and
storage of goods, air and maritime transportation, housing furnish-
ings, roads and communication industry electricity services, medical
sets, financial leases, securities, and software production, among
others.185
Incentives: ILI provided incentives and guarantees apply to
both foreign and local investors.186  Examples of guarantees include
protection against confiscation, nationalization, administrative se-
questration, seizure, price control, cancellation of licenses, and the
like.187  One example of an incentive is the exemption of taxes for a
specific period of time.188  In addition, the ILI specifies geographical
areas, called free zones, which the Cabinet determines.189  Free zones
179 Economic Update: Bright Franchising Future, OXFORD BUS. GROUP (Feb. 23,
2007), http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/economic_updates/bright-franchising-
future.
180 The Open Door Policy is the policy through which President Mohamed Anwar
Al-Sadat, who stayed in presidency from 1970 to 1981, transferred the Egyptian
economic policies to be more liberal with free trade that supports foreign invest-
ment. See Abu-Odeh, supra note 40, at 360.
181 Kendal Tyre, Franchising Sector in Egypt Receives Financial Boost, NIXON
PEABODY LLP (June 29, 2009), http://www.nixonpeabody.com/linked_media/publi-
cations/Franchise_Alert_06_29_09.pdf.
182 Law No. 8 of 1997 (Investment Incentives Law), Al-Jarida  Al-Rasmiyya, 11
May 1997, vol. 19 (Egypt).
183 Id. art. 1.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id. art. 12.
187 Id. arts. 8-14.
188 Id. art. 16.
189 Id. arts. 16-27.
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are areas where investors in specific activities can receive high incen-
tives such as removing customs, wide exemption from taxes, and fewer
requirements on imports and exports.190
Imports and exports: The Law of Importation and Exportation
No. 118 of 1975 prevents foreigners from importing into Egypt.191
Even Egyptians need to be registered in the Registrar of Imports to
import into Egypt.192  To facilitate investment, the ILI provides an ex-
ception to this rule, allowing investors in the activities provided by the
ILI, Egyptians or foreigners, to import raw materials without being
registered in the Registrar of Imports.193
Settlement of disputes:  Decree No. 170 of 2009 amended the
ILI by establishing a dispute settlement center to resolve any conflicts
arising between companies subject to the ILI, so long as the disputing
parties agree.194
Enforcement: The competent authority to enforce and supervise
ILI application is the General Authority for Investment (“GAFI”).  The
ILI established the GAFI and is subject to the Minister of
Investment.195
4.3. The Effects of the Revolution on the Egyptian Investment
The January 25 Revolution had significant effects on invest-
ment and the economy.  After the Revolution, Egypt suffered large
losses in the production and services sectors.196  These losses are esti-
mated at 55 million to 100 million Egyptian pounds (“EGP”).197  This
includes loss of real estate value and also of stock.198 International
companies working in Egypt closed after sending their employees back
190 Id.
191 Law No. 118 of 1975 (Law of Importation and Exportation), Al-Jarida Al-Ras-
miyya, 25 Sep. 1975, vol. 39 (Egypt); see also Riad, supra note 20, at 119.
192 Law No. 118 of 1975 (Law of Importation and Exportation), Al-Jarida Al-Ras-
miyya, 25 Sep. 1975, vol. 39 (Egypt).
193 Law No. 8 of 1997 (Investment Incentives Law), Al-Jarida  Al-Rasmiyya, 11
May 1997, vol. 19 (Egypt).
194 Minister of Investment Decree No. 170 of 2009 (Establishing GAFI Investors’
Disputes Settlement Center), Al-Jarida  Al-Rasmiyya, 18 Aug. 2009, vol. 192
(Egypt).
195 Presidential Decree No. 284 of 1997 (Establishing the General Authority For
Investment), Al-Jarida  Al-Rasmiyya  9 Aug. 1997, vol. 32 (Egypt).
196 Egypt Economic Losses on the Rise, AL BAWABA (Feb. 10, 2011), http://
www1.albawaba.com/main-headlines/egypt-economic-losses-rise.
197 Id.
198 Id.
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to their respective countries, banks were closed for several days, and
the stock exchange remained closed for nearly two months.199
Consequently, the GDP is expected to decrease from 5.8% in
2010 to 2.9% in 2011.200  Also, industrial production is expected to de-
crease from 5.1% in 2010 to 1.3% in 2011.201 Moreover, the EGP ex-
change rate compared to the American dollar is expected to increase
from 5.97 in 2010 to 6.31 in 2011.202  Similarly, inflation is expected to
increase from 11.8% in 2010 to 12.0% in 2011.203  To boost the Egyp-
tian economy’s recovery and to improve Egypt’s post-Revolution finan-
cial situation, Egyptian investment law needs to be reconsidered.
4.4. Recommendations to Restore Investment Cycle After the
January 25 Revolution
General Recommendation: The Egyptian government needs to
do intensive work to restore confidence in the Egyptian economy.  To
achieve higher gross rates, more attention should be given to the pro-
ductive sectors, such as industry, agriculture, and trade, in contrast to
the declining services sectors, such as the Suez Canal, tourism, and
expatriates working abroad. It may be useful to institute programs to
spread awareness, and offer training services and investment advice
for specific kinds of young or uneducated investors.
The Islamic economic sector, represented in banks and compa-
nies working according to Islamic teachings, constitutes an extralegal
sector representing a parallel market.204  These institutions are kept
outside the legal organization in that they consider themselves as po-
litically and economically powerful as the secular state.205  Ignoring
such a large amount of Muslim worker owned capital causes a huge
loss to the economy and leads investors to work in a parallel mar-
199 Heineken Company evacuated 25 employees, Nestle´ SA evacuated around 20
employees, and Nissan Motor Co. stopped its operations in Egypt. See Egypt Un-
rest: Banks Reopen After Week of Closure, BBC NEWS (Feb. 6, 2011), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12376403; Adam Mitchell & Nour Malas, Firms
Pull Staff, Halt Operations, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 1, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/arti-
cle/SB10001424052748703439504576115631410098672.html; Ivan Watson, Egyp-
tian Stock Market Opens, Plunges, CNN (Mar. 23, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/
2011-03-23/world/egypt.stock.market_1_stock-market-egyptian-voters-plunges?_
s=PM:WORLD.
200 Oren Klachkin, Country & Industry Forecasting: Egypt, IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT,
http://myinsight.ihsglobalinsight.com/servlet/cats?filterID=1147&serviceID=4078
&typeID=15431&pageContent=report&pageType=ALL (last visited Oct. 15, 2011).
201 Id. at 27.
202 Id. at 37.
203 Id. at 4, 35.
204 Abu-Odeh, supra note 40, at 366.
205 Id. at 367.
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ket.206  Hence, the Egyptian market’s regular cycle needs to involve
Islamic capital.  For instance, to fully involve them in the market,
Muslim workers should be allowed to have their own labor unions and
organizations.  This would allow their capital to flow through the en-
tire economic cycle, instead of isolating it within their own legal, eco-
nomic and political cocoons.207
The formalities and procedures required to open new business
investments in Egypt need to be streamlined through legal reform.
Complicated procedures reduce investment opportunities and the
chances of expanding businesses.208  Thus, to save time and money
and encourage young investors, the required fees to establish a new
business should be lowered, electronic procedures should be accessible,
and the license issuing process should be easier.
Also, legal reform with regard to loans and financing should be
reconsidered. Real or personal collateral are usually required to guar-
antee loans in Egypt.209  Real collateral usually consists of mortgages
on movable and immovable assets.210  The problem with real estate
collateral is the difficulty in proving ownership as per the lending
banks requirements.211  This difficulty is due to the lack of asset own-
ership registration with governmental authorities.212  Although Egypt
has a comprehensive law on property registration, property owners are
usually reluctant to satisfy property title registration because it helps
them avoid paying high registration fees and taxes.213  About 92% of
Egyptians own unregistered property,214 estimated at a value of 248
billion USD.215  This property cannot be used as collateral for loans or
to secure any other long-term contractual transaction.216  Having
easy, quick, and reasonable registration procedures creates better in-
vestment opportunities.
206 See id. at 366.
207 See id. at 380-81.
208 Abdul Ghaffar Shokr, Tackling the Leviathan: Reforming Egyptian Bureau-
cracy for Improved Economic Growth, in CTR. FOR INT’L PRIVATE ENTER. 11 (2010),
http://www.cipe-arabia.org/files/pdf/Bureaucracy-EN.pdf.
209 See Z. Bahaa-Eldin, Formal and Informal Finance in Egypt, in LEGAL PLURAL-
ISM IN THE ARAB WORLD 210, 211 (Baudouin Dupret, Maurits Berger & Laila al
Zwaini eds., 1999).
210 Id.; see ALLEAUME, supra note 14, at 11-12.
211 Bahaa-Eldin, supra note 209, at 213.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Hernando De Soto, Egypt’s Economic Apartheid, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 3, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704358704576118683913032882.
html.
215 Id.
216 Id.
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Other investment tools also need to be legally regulated.  For
instance, Egypt does not have a law that organizes franchising trans-
actions.217 Egypt has a specialized franchise association, the EFDA,
but with little awareness of what franchising entails.218  Economic
risks, lack of franchising laws, and changes in political conditions re-
present the most important constraints to the development of Egyp-
tian franchising.219  Because no specific law regulates franchising in
Egypt, general provisions of a host of different laws govern franchising
transactions, including contracts, commercial transactions, intellec-
tual property, taxation, insurance, and labor laws.220  The applicable
law is usually the law that has the most proper linkage to the
franchise agreement.221  The application of such a variety of laws and
regulations contradicts the specific nature of franchising transactions.
These franchising transactions require high protection for both par-
ties, especially with the fast growth of technology and the complexity
of the recent technical aspects of international licensing transactions.
Therefore, a specialized Egyptian franchising law is necessary because
franchising parties usually prefer agreements to be governed by a sim-
ple and comprehensive law rather than different laws. The application
of various laws complicates decisions on various issues arising from
franchise agreements.
Getting the money to start a new program may pose an obsta-
cle for investors.  Hence, the government needs to help create access to
credit.  Providing government-lending programs to new businesses
with reasonable interest rates may also prove beneficial.
Recommendations related to the ILI: The discretionary power
granted to the Cabinet under the ILI should be limited to prevent
abuse of power.  For instance, if needed, the Cabinet has the right to
add any other economic activity to those mentioned in the law.222  Sim-
ilarly, the Cabinet has absolute discretionary power to allow investors
217 Radwa S. Elsaman, Towards an Egyptian Franchising Law Based on a Com-
parative Study of the Laws Of The United States, China, and Malaysia (Jan. 2009)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, American University) (on file with author).
218 J. Perry Maisonneuve, Franchising in the Middle East and North Africa: Busi-
ness Perspective, A.B.A. FORUM ON FRANCHISING & A.B.A. CTR. FOR CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUC. 16 (2010).
219 Id.
220 Elsaman, supra note 217.
221 Michael K. Lindsey, Introduction to Franchising in the Middle East: Navigat-
ing the Risks and Rewards of the World’s Most Interested Market, A.B.A. FORUM
ON FRANCHISING & A.B.A. CTR. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 15 (2010); Maison-
neuve, supra note 218.
222 Law No. 8 of 1997 (Investment Incentives Law), Al-Jarida  Al-Rasmiyya,11
May 1997, vol. 19, art. 2 (Egypt).
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to own the necessary land to exercise their activities.223  Also, the ILI
gives the Cabinet the authority to grant any public sector owned land
to investors who are subject to the ILI.   Moreover, the Cabinet is given
the absolute power to establish free zones.224  Likewise, the ILI pro-
hibits decisions regulating the establishment and operation of projects
except after obtaining Cabinet approval.225  Hence, giving the prime
minister absolute discretion to decide ILI enforcement may lead to its
abandonment, particularly in instances of corruption.  Therefore, there
should be a supervision or limitation of the absolute power granted to
the prime minister in ILI application.  This supervision may take place
through the establishment of an authority or committee that is inde-
pendent of the Cabinet. This committee may watch ILI enforcement to
ensure that the ILI guaranteed incentives are effective.
Similarly, the ILI allows the prime minister to form a commit-
tee to decide upon any complaints investors submit against the admin-
istrative bodies enforcing the ILI rules.226  The ILI also requires that
the prime minister must approve this committee’s decisions.227  This
leads to loss of neutrality because if the Cabinet is in a dispute, the
deciding committee is not independent of the Cabinet. This rule should
be amended so that the deciding committee is independent of the Cabi-
net.  Similarly, GAFI, the competent authority that enforces and su-
pervises ILI application, is subject to the Minister of Investment.228
GAFI needs to be independent from the Ministry of Investment to fa-
cilitate as much transparency as possible.
To attract investments and restore the Egyptian economy, the
ILI should renew temporary incentives. For instance, the ILI provides
tax exemptions and free tariffs for specific periods of time after the ILI
becomes enforceable.229  These exemptions almost have expired and
need to be renewed.
Finally, Law No. 114 of 2008 amended the ILI. This law ex-
cluded companies working in oil production, iron, and fertilizers from
the scope of ILI application and from all investment incentives and
guarantees.230  The amending law offers no reason for such exclusion
223 Id. art. 12.
224 Id. art. 29.
225 Id. art. 49.
226 Id. art. 66.
227 Id.
228 Presidential Decree No. 284 of 1997 (Establishing the General Authority For
Investment), Al-Jarida  Al-Rasmiyya  9 Aug. 1997, vol. 32, art. 1 (Egypt).
229 Law No. 8 of 1997 (Investment Incentives Law), Al-Jarida  Al-Rasmiyya, 11
May 1997, vol. 19., art. 16 (Egypt) (as amended by Law No. 91 of 2005, 9 June
2005, vol. 23 (Egypt)).
230 Law No. 114 of 2008, Al-Jarida  Al-Rasmiyya, 5 May 2008, vol, 18, art. 11
(Egypt).
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except personal goals arising from financial corruption and private
ends of its supporters.  The exclusion of all companies working in these
fields led to the elimination of investment in these sectors, concentrat-
ing these industries in the hands of very few producers. This concen-
tration, in turn, led to monopolies and cartels.  This law needs to be
eliminated to protect competition and prevent monopolies.  Similarly,
Law No. 133 of 2010, preventing oil-refining companies established in
free zones from benefiting of ILI provided tax exemptions,231 also
needs to be reconsidered.
5. CONCLUSION
Egypt underwent many economic and legal reforms that re-
sulted in remarkable economic growth at the turn of the century. Due
to widespread corruption, however, this economic growth mostly bene-
fited the small clique of powerful officials and businessmen.  Unsatis-
fied Egyptians then took their demands for a better life to the streets,
culminating in the January Revolution.  Although there were other po-
litical motivations to the Revolution, socioeconomic stances were at its
heart.
The Revolution is expected to have a positive impact on curbing
corruption and enhancing law enforcement. Still, the social anarchy
and political instability caused by the Revolution have shaken investor
confidence in the Egyptian market.  To restore confidence in Egyptian
markets and encourage post-Revolution investment, Egypt’s economic
laws, particularly the Capital Market Law and the Investment Law
should be attractive to investors.
The CML was initially an incomprehensive regulation of
Egypt’s capital market and did not include vital activities and prac-
tices in its provisions. Due to several amendments over the years, the
CML has become a substantively mature legislation. The major con-
cern about Egypt’s capital markets is a lack of legal compliance. There-
fore, new methods that encourage better compliance must be
developed.
Similarly, the ILI has progressively introduced a number of in-
centives designed to promote various aspects of investment within the
last few years.  Most of these incentives, however, ended due to either
ILI operation or unfair practices that restricted competition and mo-
nopolized specific production sectors.  The ILI needs to be reconsidered
to restore investment in Egypt in the aftermath of the Revolution.
Raising legal compliance and developing methods to enhance
its enforcement are amongst the most crucial reforms imminently re-
231 Law No. 133 of 2010, Al-Jarida  Al-Rasmiyya, 19 June 2010, vol., 24, art. 1
(Egypt).
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quired to boost the Egyptian economy.  These reforms will increase the
level of transparency and promote investors’ confidence in the Egyp-
tian market.
